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 1 
Secrecy, spies and the global South: intelligence studies beyond the ‘Five Eyes’ alliance 
ZAKIA SHIRAZ and RICHARD J. ALDRICH*
Most states in the world, large or small, have a substantial tradition of espionage and internal 
security organizations, engaging in all manner of surveillance activities. The literature on this 
subject is increasingly voluminous and sophisticated.1 Yet in more than a century of writing 
on intelligence, the study of secret services has largely been dominated by an Anglo-
American perspective. Both the empirical focus of scholarly inquiry and the conceptual 
framing of intelligence remain firmly rooted in the experiences of the United States and its 
English-speaking allies.2 Although this work is sophisticated and can claim to have recovered 
a ‘missing dimension’ of international studies, it is largely the work of western scholars who 
have tended to assume that they are describing intelligence in global terms.3 The importance 
of intelligence studies has been bolstered by a growing perception of its salience within both 
public and policy spheres, but the resulting tendency of the mainstream International 
Relations (IR) literature to take more notice of intelligence, surveillance and secrecy has only 
reinforced this Anglocentrism.4 
This striking imbalance in the literature has not gone unnoticed. As early as 1988, Adda 
Bozeman penned a path-breaking essay on the importance of thinking more widely about 
                                                 
* The authors would like to acknowledge the support of the Leverhulme Trust. 
1 For recent commentaries see Lewis Herrington, ‘The debatable land: spies, secrets and 
persistent shadows’, International Affairs 94: 3, 2018, pp. 645–55; Simon Willmetts, ‘The 
CIA and the invention of tradition’, Journal of Intelligence History 14: 2, 2015, pp. 112–28. 
2 Philip H. J. Davies and Kristian C. Gustafson, eds, Intelligence elsewhere: spies and 
espionage outside the Anglosphere (Washington DC: Georgetown University Press, 2016), 
pp. 3–11; Peter Gill and Mark Phythian, ‘What is intelligence studies?’ International Journal 
of Intelligence, Security, and Public Affairs 18: 1, 2016, p. 10; Damien Van Puyvelde and 
Sean Curtis, ‘“Standing on the shoulders of giants”: diversity and scholarship in intelligence 
studies’, Intelligence and National Security 31: 7, 2016, p. 1041. 
3 Christopher Andrew and David Dilks, eds, The missing dimension: governments and 
intelligence communities in the twentieth century (London: Macmillan, 1984). 
4 e.g. Rory Cormac, Disrupt and deny: spies, special forces and the secret pursuit of British 
foreign policy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018); Austin Carson, Secret wars: covert 
conflict in international politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2018). 
 
intelligence cultures.5 In the same year, Eduardo E. Estévez offered one of the first 
assessments of intelligence and democratic transitions grounded in the Latin American 
experience of the Third Wave.6 In 1996, Mexico’s leading intelligence expert, Sergio Aguayo 
Quezada, lamented this imbalance as ‘not only absurd, but dangerous’.7 Later, regional 
scholars Fredy Rivera Vélez and Katalina Barreiro challenged the liberal democratic 
dominance of the intelligence literature through an emphasis on local political history, 
institutional culture and democratic development.8 More recently still, Philip J. Davies and 
Kristian Gustafson, in an important agenda-setting contribution entitled Intelligence 
elsewhere, have called for the comparative study of national intelligence outside what they 
term the ‘Anglosphere’.9 Over the past decade, a notable trend among academics working in 
both intelligence studies and surveillance studies has been to refocus on the global South.10 
These two related subdisciplines, one emphasizing realist and empirical approaches derived 
from contemporary history and international security, the other favouring post-modern and 
conceptual approaches rooted in sociology and media studies, have noted the relative lack of 
attention to the secret services of Asia, Africa, the Middle East and Latin America.11 
                                                 
5 Adda Bozeman, ‘Political intelligence in non-western societies: suggestions for comparative 
research’, in Roy Godson, ed., Comparing foreign intelligence: the US, the USSR, the UK 
and the Third World (Washington DC: Pergamon, 1988). 
6 Eduardo E. Estévez, Seguridad e inteligencia en el estado democrático (Buenos Aires: 
Fundación Arturo Illia para Democracia y la Paz, 1988). 
7 Sergio Aguayo Quezada, ‘Intelligence services and the transition to democracy in Mexico’, 
in John Bailey and Sergio Aguayo Quezada, eds, Strategy and security in US–Mexican 
relations beyond the Cold War (San Diego: University of California Press, 1996). 
8 Fredy Rivera Veléz and Katalina Barreiro Santana, eds, Inteligencia estratégica y 
prospectiva (Quito: Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales, 2011), p. 29. 
9 Philip H. J. Davies and Kristian C. Gustafson, ‘An agenda for the comparative study of 
intelligence’ in Davies and Gustafson, eds, Intelligence elsewhere, pp. 3–6. 
10 Zakia Shiraz, ‘Drugs and dirty wars: intelligence cooperation in the global South’, Third 
World Quarterly 34: 10, 2013, pp. 1749–66. 
11 Florina Cristiana Matei and Thomas Bruneau, ‘Intelligence reform in new democracies: 
factors supporting or arresting progress’, Democratization 18: 3, 2011, p. 605; Aaron W. 
Navarro, Political intelligence and the creation of modern Mexico, 1938–1954 (University 
Park, PA: Pennsylvania University Press, 2010), pp. 4–5. 
 
Intelligence has shifted and is no longer the sole preserve of states. Regional and international 
organizations, including the once-promising Latin American trade bloc Mercosur, the African 
Union, the European Union, and perhaps most notably the United Nations, have become 
increasingly active in this field since the 1990s.12 Meanwhile, private companies, especially 
those engaged in commodity extraction across the global South, have long maintained 
significant intelligence capabilities and working relationships with local secret services.13 The 
obvious question is why, given the ubiquity of intelligence entities, the conceptualization of 
intelligence remains narrowly derived from the experiences of the Anglo-Saxon world, 
sometimes referred to in practitioner parlance as the ‘UKUSA’ partners, or the ‘Five Eyes’ 
alliance? One answer is that the so-called ‘Old Dominions,’ including Canada, Australia and 
New Zealand, all prioritised information as an aspect of national strategic culture.14 Another 
answer, is that we suggest here, is that studying intelligence in the global South poses 
complex challenges.  
The term ‘global South’ is increasingly deployed to explain a rather peculiar mix of countries 
and regions. For multilateral agencies, it refers low- and middle-income countries in Africa, 
Asia, Africa, the Caribbean and Latin America. But the term functions as more than a 
metaphor for economic underdevelopment. In IR, political science and development studies, 
                                                 
12 Lauren Hutton, ‘Regional security and intelligence cooperation in Africa: the potential 
contribution of the committee on intelligence’, in Ulf Engel and João Gomes Porto, eds, 
Towards an African peace and security regime: continental embeddedness, transnational 
linkages, strategic relevance (Abingdon: Routledge, 2016), pp. 179–94; José Manuel Ugarte, 
‘Panorama de la inteligencia criminal Latinoamericana’, URVIO Revista Latinoamericana de 
Estudios de Seguridad 15, 2015, p. 44; Arile Ahram and J. Paul Goode, ‘Researching 
authoritarianism in the discipline of democracy’, Social Science Quarterly 97: 4, 2016, pp. 
834–49. 
13 Oxford Business Group, The report: Colombia 2013 (Medellín: Grupo Bancolombia, 
2013), p. 147; Americas Market Intelligence, Managing mining risk in Latin America (Coral 
Gables, FL, Oct. 2018), pp. 16–17.  
14 The exact nature of the UKUSA intelligence alliance remains remarkably contested, see for 
example: Jason Dittmer, ‘Everyday diplomacy: UKUSA intelligence cooperation and geopolitical 
assemblages,’ Annals of the Association of American Geographers 105.3, 2015, pp. 604-619; Patrick 
Walsh and Seumas Miller, ‘Rethinking ‘Five Eyes’ security intelligence collection policies and 
practice post Snowden,’ Intelligence and National Security 31.3, 2016, pp. 345-368. 
 
the North–South dichotomy incorporates the history of colonialism, neo-colonialism, 
geopolitical relations, and differences in social, political and economic processes. For area 
specialists, the idea of the South is conceptualized as a region of distinctive intellectual 
production. By contrast, for intelligence and surveillance studies, the primary focus of 
scholarly work has been western intelligence services, largely conceptualized through the 
historic East–West divide of the Cold War. As intelligence and surveillance studies adjust 
their focus to look beyond the Anglosphere, and inevitably seek to reconceptualize 
intelligence, these broader approaches to understanding the global South could prove to be 
useful in avoiding the pitfalls of overgeneralization. This is particularly important in the 
context of uneven democratic development in the global South, which underscores the 
salience of explicit differentiation of intelligence systems between authoritarian states, hybrid 
regimes, and countries undergoing democratic transition and consolidation.  
Intelligence in the global South is now emerging as one of the central axes of inquiry in the 
field. We have witnessed an increasing flow of publications and conference papers probing 
the activities of secret services that were unknown to academic research ten years ago.15 Not 
only are we beginning to see a greater number of detailed monographs on the subterranean 
activities of particular countries, we are also beginning to see comparative work, often with a 
regional focus that allows us to begin to think in terms of new typologies and to locate the 
development of these secret services within wider frameworks that draw on ideas of state 
formation and historical sociology.16 This comparative work is perhaps most advanced 
                                                 
15 Dina Rezk, ‘Egypt’s spy chiefs: servants or leaders?’ in Paul Maddrell, Mark Stout, 
Christopher Moran and Ioanna Iordanou, eds, Intelligence leaders in Europe, the Middle 
East, and Asia (Washington DC: Georgetown University Press, 2018); Maha Abdelrahman, 
‘Policing neoliberalism in Egypt: the continuing rise of the “securocratic” state’, Third World 
Quarterly 38: 1, 2017, pp. 185–202; Jane Duncan, ‘Taking the spy machine south: 
communications surveillance in sub-Saharan Africa’, in Bruce Mutsvairo, ed., The Palgrave 
handbook of media and communication research in Africa (London: Palgrave, 2018), pp. 
153–76; Mariano Bartolomé, Inteligencia estratégica contemporánea: perspectivas desde la 
región suramericana (Sangolquí: Universidad de las Fuerzas Armadas ESPE, 2016). 
16 John Kasuku, Intelligence reform in the post-dictatorial Democratic Republic of Congo: a 
critical analysis of DRC’s intelligence service (Geneva: Globethics.net, 2016);  
 
among Latin Americanists and points to nascent disciplinary divisions about how to move 
forward.17  
Yet there has been only limited reflection on the fundamental reasons for this imbalance—
and limited consideration of the extent to which the study of intelligence and security 
agencies in the global South requires different methods.18 Much of the new work on the 
developing regions carries the underlying assumption that we can ‘copy and paste’ the 
approaches that have been deployed to study the United States and its allies onto new and 
challenging projects about intelligence elsewhere. At times, this methodological blind spot 
has resulted in collections of largely descriptive essays with a state-centric focus. But perhaps 
most importantly, contemporary and historical analyses have sometimes relied on the 
recycling of previously classified ‘internal’ studies or polemical material that has emerged as 
the result of regional rivalries, typically over Kashmir.19 
The global South is notably absent from the dominant texts on intelligence theory or 
intelligence research methodology.20 These landmark meta-level works are important as they 
constitute the foremost conceptual studies for a subject that is often regarded as somewhat 
                                                 
Carolina Sancho Hirane, 'Democracia, política pública de inteligencia y desafíos 
actualestendencias en países de Latinoamérica', Inteligencia y seguridad: Revista de análisis 
y prospectiva, 11: 1, 2012, pp. 67-102; Navarro, Political intelligence. 
17 Gregory Weeks, ‘A preference for deference: reforming the military’s intelligence role in 
Argentina, Chile and Peru’, Third World Quarterly 29: 1, 2008, pp. 45–61; Veléz and 
Santana, Inteligencia estratégica; Nelson Arteaga, ‘Doing surveillance studies in Latin 
America: social sorting in contexts of violence’, Surveillance and Society 13: 1, 2015, pp. 
78–90. 
18 Methodological reflections in intelligence studies are rare; but see Andrew Hammond, 
‘Through a glass, darkly: the CIA and oral history’, History 100: 340, 2015, pp. 311–26. 
19 Prem Mahadevan, Islamism and intelligence in South Asia: militancy, politics and security 
(London: Bloomsbury, 2018); Vikram Sood, The unending game: a former R&AW chief’s 
insights into espionage (Delhi: Penguin, 2018).  
20 Peter Gill, Stephen Marrin and Mark Phythian, eds, Intelligence theory: key questions and 
debates (London: Routledge, 2008); Stephen Coulthart, Michael Landon-Murray and Damien 
Van Puyvelde, eds, Researching national security intelligence: multidisciplinary approaches 
(Washington DC: Georgetown University Press, 2019). 
 
‘under-theorized’, at least by comparison with other areas of international studies.21 The 
recent Routledge companion to intelligence studies contains twelve essays about specific 
countries, none of which are less developed countries.22 Equally, in an Oxford University 
Press anthology entitled Intelligence: the secret world of spies, the entire ‘world’ surveyed 
consists of the United States until the very last section, which is rather awkwardly entitled 
‘Intelligence in other lands’—and this apologetic coda consists of two essays about the 
United Kingdom and Russia.23 So while we have begun to see essays, and even books, about 
the secret services of countries such as Mexico and Egypt, they remain outliers, not only in 
terms of their numbers but also because of the failure of subject leaders to explicitly consider 
them within the dominant analyses on research approaches or the conceptualization of 
intelligence.24  
Curiously, surveillance studies is no less Anglospheric.25 While its mission has been 
distinctive, focusing on the theorizing of surveillance power, its excursions outside the 
Anglosphere have mostly been limited to post-communist authoritarian states such as Russia, 
China and the countries of eastern Europe, or surveillance in the context of globalization and 
global capital.26 Much of its literature about the global South remains focused on country-
specific accounts interspersed with familiar frameworks borrowed from Orwell, Bentham and 
Foucault. In other words, for the purposes of conceptualization, the usual western suspects 
                                                 
21 Christopher Andrew, ‘Intelligence, international relations and “under-theorisation”’, 
Intelligence and National Security 19: 2, 2004, pp. 170–84. 
22 Robert Dover, Michael Goodman and Claudia Hillebrand, eds, Routledge companion to 
intelligence studies (London: Routledge, 2013). 
23 Loch Johnson and James Wirtz, eds, Intelligence: the secret world of spies. An anthology 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011). 
24 e.g. Richard Betts, Enemies of intelligence: knowledge and power in American national 
security (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009. 
25 e.g. Kirstie Ball, David Lyon and Kevin Haggerty, eds, Routledge handbook of 
surveillance studies (London: Routledge, 2012); Gary T. Marx, Windows into the soul: 
surveillance and society in an age of high technology (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
2016). 
26 David Mukarami Wood, ‘Globalization and surveillance’, in Ball et al., eds, Routledge 
handbook of surveillance studies, pp. 333–42. 
 
are rounded up.27 While surveillance studies can rightly claim to be more conceptual than its 
sister subject intelligence studies, it has nevertheless used quite a narrow range of theory to 
reflect on the surveillance practices of more developed states, while failing to build bridges 
with development studies or area studies.28 
We argue that both intelligence studies and surveillance studies could learn much from 
comparative politics and area studies researchers. Secret services are subjects that have long 
been a matter of interest to area studies researchers and ethnographers precisely because, in 
these fields, academics can be subjected to unwelcome attention by the security agencies of 
the countries they wish to study. This is perhaps best illustrated by one of the most recent 
handbooks on methods for research in the Middle East and North Africa, which opens rather 
ominously with an essay entitled ‘Encountering the Mukhabarat state’.29 We therefore ask, in 
an era increasingly obsessed with researcher safety: is the new frontier of secret service 
research in the global South already being constrained before it has really begun? 
While the tension between university ethical frameworks and academic research is not 
irreconcilable, it is heightened for scholars of intelligence and surveillance studies. This is 
partly because of the nature of secrecy, but also, and more importantly, it is a result of the 
rather narrow focus on western intelligence in which there has been only a limited need to 
reflect on research ethics and methods. Accordingly, breaking out of the Anglospheric bubble 
will require scholars to embrace a wider range of ideas and approaches. This might not 
necessarily require a new theoretical lexicon but will certainly require wider frameworks, 
together with new methods that appreciate the difficulties of examining these subjects in a 
landscape that can be hostile to the academic researcher. 
Designing your secret service 
                                                 
27 Karin Dean, ‘Myanmar: surveillance and the turn from authoritarianism?’ Surveillance and 
Society 15: 3–4, 2017, pp. 496–505. 
28 But see Katherine Wisser and Joel Blanco-Rivera, ‘Surveillance, documentation and 
privacy: an international comparative analysis of state intelligence records’, Archival Science 
16: 2, 2016, pp. 125–47. 
29 Jillian Schwedler and Janine A. Clark, ‘Encountering the Mukhabarat state’, in Janine A. 
Clark and Francesco Cavatorta, eds, Political science research in the Middle East and North 
Africa: methodological and ethical challenges (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018), pp. 
23–34. 
 
The question of what kind of overarching concepts we might consider when researching the 
global South is especially slippery. Intelligence studies developed during the Cold War and 
imported ideas that reflect a historic East–West divide. Western liberal democratic states 
have therefore conceptualized their secret services as defenders of their freedoms against 
foreign adversaries. They have historically prioritized intelligence to support wider foreign 
policy initiatives or pugilistic counter-insurgency campaigns while characterizing their 
opponents as authoritarian ‘counterintelligence states’.30 These simple typologies have 
always been challenged by more critical literatures that perceive all secret services as 
praetorian.31 However, they are even less sustainable in a world where, even by a stringent 
criterion, over 47 per cent of the world’s population is thought to reside in a country classed 
as a ‘full’ or ‘flawed’ democracy. A further 16.7 per cent live under ‘hybrid’ regimes that 
consist of countries still in the process of democratic transition or consolidation. China, the 
world’s biggest authoritarian state, accounts for a large share of the estimated 35.6 per cent of 
the global population under authoritarian rule.32 
At first glance, it seems absurd to use typologies derived from the study of the CIA and the 
KGB to study the secret services of the global South. But others might respond that this is 
exactly where their recondite agencies originate. Latin America’s secret services have been 
historically viewed as ‘apprentice agencies’ of the CIA and FBI—the region’s governments 
and state security forces at large having been willing recipients of external training to curb 
the threat of right-wing Falangist and Nazi elements.33 One of the first requests for help to set 
up a secret service came from Brazil in 1938, quickly followed by another from Colombia.34 
                                                 
30 e.g. Robert W. Pringle, ‘Andropov’s counterintelligence state’, Journal of Intelligence and 
Counterintelligence 13: 2, 2000, pp. 193–203; Kevin O’Brien, ‘Counter-intelligence for 
counter-revolutionary warfare: the South African police security branch 1979–2010’, 
Intelligence and National Security 16: 3, 2010, pp. 27–59. 
31 E. P. Thompson, ‘The secret state’, Race and Class 20: 3, 1979, pp. 219–42. 
32 Economist Intelligence Unit, Democracy Index 2018: Me too? Political participation, 
protest and democracy (London, Jan. 2019), pp. 2–3, 9. 
33 Navarro, Political intelligence, p. 4; Dennis M. Rempe, ‘The origin of internal security in 
Colombia, part I: a CIA special team surveys la Violencia, 1959–60’, Small Wars and 
Insurgencies 10: 3, 1999, pp. 24–61. 
34 Martha K. Huggins, ‘US-supported state terror: a history of police training in Latin 
America’, Crime and Social Justice, 27/28, 1987, pp. 154–5. 
 
This effort was supported by the Special Intelligence Service (SIS), a covert counter-
intelligence branch of the FBI that constituted the first foreign intelligence bureaucracy in US 
history. It deployed some 700 agents across the region and quickly transformed itself into an 
industrial-scale surveillance mission of the left, targeting a broad range of local political and 
labour organizations.35 By contrast, Argentina’s first state-level intelligence agency, the 
Secretaría de Inteligencia, was set up by General Juan Perón in 1946 with the help of former 
Nazi agents, some of whom served in the organization. 
In Asia and Africa, the origins of secret services often lie with colonial constructs or post-
imperial legacies. Pakistan’s Inter-Service Intelligence or ISI, its much-discussed military 
intelligence service, was arguably the product of a multi-layered imperial legacy, since it was 
created in 1948 by an Australian army officer, Major-General Walter Cawthorne, who had 
served in the Indian Army, but then changed allegiance to the new state of Pakistan.36 A 
similar double colonial legacy was exemplified by the work of Ian Henderson. Having served 
in an intelligence and security capacity during the Mau Mau rebellion in Kenya, he was 
recruited by Bahrain to reform its security and remained in place there until 1998.37 Some of 
these legacies of external training have had comical consequences. In Fiji, the domestic 
security service reportedly struggled to cooperate with the country’s foreign intelligence 
service because the former had been trained by the Hong Kong Special Branch while the 
latter had been trained by the CIA; and so, despite both services being ‘Fijian’, they operated 
with clashing organizational cultures borrowed from elsewhere.38  
The origins of intelligence services in the global South vary considerably. While the legacy 
of external training and shared heritage is significant, moving beyond the Anglosphere 
requires an understanding of how intelligence apparatuses evolve in countries undergoing 
democratic transition or consolidating democratic governance from authoritarianism or the 
legacy of colonial rule. One of the hallmarks of intelligence in the global South, particularly 
                                                 
35 Marc Becker, The FBI in Latin America: the Ecuador files (Durham, NC: Duke University 
Press, 2017), p. 3. 
36 Hein Kiessling, Faith, unity, discipline: the Inter-Service-Intelligence (ISI) of Pakistan 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), pp. 14–15. 
37 William Roger Louis, ‘Britain and the Middle East after 1945’, in L. Carl Brown, ed., 
Diplomacy in the Middle East: the international relations of regional and outside powers 
(London: Tauris, 2004), p. 50. 
38 Private information. 
 
in states undergoing democratic transition, is often the historic redirection from serving the 
state bureaucracy to protecting the premier and working on behalf of a particular political 
party.39 This is perhaps best captured by the experience of Latin America, which saw 
widespread democratic transitions throughout the 1980s: while the region is widely regarded 
as the most democratic in the developing world, it continues to suffer from the pervasive 
problem of partisan abuse of intelligence services and a tendency for elements of the secret 
services to pursue their own agendas. Since 2015 alone, domestic spying scandals and cases 
of abuse of power have engulfed the secret services of Argentina, Colombia, El Salvador, 
Mexico, Panama, Peru, Paraguay and Venezuela.40 This raises the wider issue of the 
relationship between democratic governance, oversight mechanisms and organizational 
culture within intelligence services, which will become increasingly pertinent for 
transitioning countries in the global South. 
Uneven democratic development in the global South presents challenges in the search for 
more appropriate conceptual frameworks. Ahram and Goode argue that the past decade has 
seen a growth in new forms of government that combine a degree of electoral contestation 
with media manipulation and a continued monopoly of power. Largely concentrated in 
Africa, the Middle East, and parts of Asia and eastern Europe, these regimes are often 
designated ‘semi‐ authoritarian’, ‘electorally authoritarian’ or ‘managed democracies’.41 
Their intelligence and security regimes are certainly worthy of analysis but remain difficult to 
categorize.  
Arguably, such classification systems can also serve to hinder endeavours to move beyond 
the Anglosphere. First, many of the countries placed in such categories have recently 
emerged from or are still experiencing internal conflict, circumstances which undoubtedly 
alter the nature and texture of their secret services as well as systems of accountability. Here, 
we require new sets of ideas that are sensitive to patronage and personal networks, 
particularly in conflict and post-conflict environments, as well as traditional theories of 
                                                 
39 e.g. Barry Gilder, Songs and secrets: South Africa from liberation to governance (London: 
Hurst, 2012). 
40 Andrés Gómez de la Torre Rotta, ‘Servicios de inteligencia y democracia en América del 
Sur: ¿Hacia una segunda generación de reformas normativas?’ Agenda Internacional 16: 27, 
2009, pp. 119–30. 
41 Arile Ahram and J. Paul Goode, ‘Researching authoritarianism in the discipline of 
democracy’, Social Science Quarterly 97: 4, 2016, pp. 834–49. 
 
bureaucracy and organization. Second, such classification systems neglect trends in 
democratic design, particularly between parliamentary and presidential systems of 
governance, that inevitably have impacts on the types of oversight mechanisms adopted. 
Finally, the emergent confusion about the reconceptualization of democratic regimes has 
sought to classify regimes emerging from authoritarianism by using adjectives to qualify 
‘democratic’, a practice which will inevitably lead to outliers. Perhaps the most obvious 
example is Latin America, where bad habits within the secret services persist largely as a 
result of the failure to achieve effective intelligence accountability and oversight, while two-
thirds of the region’s countries are nevertheless considered to be ‘fully’ or ‘flawed’ 
functioning democracies, boasting some of the world’s highest scores for electoral process 
and pluralism, and civil liberties.42 Colombia, the region’s most stable democracy, saw its 
premier intelligence agency dissolved in 2011 following reports of an open door policy 
between the director of intelligence and paramilitary commanders.  
The study of the secret services in Latin America is one of the more developed areas of 
intelligence beyond the Anglosphere.43 However, much of this literature has appeared 
through welcome scholarly innovation outside intelligence studies and as the result of two 
factors that have combined to hinder academic development in intelligence. First, 
‘intelligence’ is a dirty word in Latin America, historically associated with the region’s 
dictatorships or external (and often covert) intervention. Second, Latin American states have 
failed to establish boundaries that demarcate what constitutes national security. During the 
dictatorships of the twentieth century and subsequent transitions to democracy, studies of the 
authoritarian intelligence systems were largely undertaken by scholars in area studies and 
political science, aided by truth commissions that sought accountability for human rights 
abuses. Democratic transitions and transitional justice saw new interest from scholars of law 
that were central in bringing questions of intelligence accountability, oversight and reform to 
the forefront of national security debates. More recently, some Latin American states have 
                                                 
42 Economist Intelligence Unit, Democracy Index 2018, p. 9. 
43 e.g. J. Patrice McSherry, Predatory states: Operation Condor and covert war in Latin 
America (Plymouth: Rowman & Littlefield, 2005); Eduardo E. Estevez, ‘Comparing 
intelligence democratization in Latin America: Argentina, Peru, and Ecuador’, Intelligence 
and National Security 29: 4, 2014, pp. 552–80. 
 
adopted a more relaxed approach to their internal histories through declassification, which 
has seen the emergence of growing literature on secret agencies.44 
Historically, there has been much general research about governments that depend on 
repression, but specific studies on secret agencies in the global South remain limited. In the 
past ten years, we have seen a small but steadily growing literature on regime resilience, 
coercive institutions and the machinery of state security.45 The conventional wisdom on 
authoritarian regimes is that leaders ‘pack’ their secret services with people who are loyal. 
These might be officers who fought with them during the coup that brought them to power, or 
else tribal or sect members. Within fragmented countries, autocrats often draw on their own 
ethnic groups and appoint relatives to head the key agencies. In return, these in-groups are 
rewarded for their readiness to deliver coercion on behalf of the regime and for linking their 
own security with the survival of the leader. But it has long been argued that ‘packing’ can be 
a losing strategy, increasing the potential for coups and other regime problems; so there are 
plenty of examples of heterogeneity. Perhaps one of the most important features of 
intelligence under authoritarian regimes is that intelligence services are not always 
‘designed’, but often develop in a more ad hoc manner that is principally responsive to the 
shifting priorities and fears of those at the helm of the state, rather than as the expression of a 
particular strategic vision.46 
Recent research on Asia, focusing on the Philippines, South Korea and Taiwan, suggests just 
such a theory. While accepting that most autocrats prioritize protection against assassination, 
coups, revolts and external attacks, Sheena Greitens suggests that there are distinct types of 
approaches. She argues that a range of typologies can be identified around related ideas of 
social exclusivity and organizational fragmentation. As we have seen, some security 
apparatuses reflect the broad makeup of the country, while others are composed of a 
particular ethnic group or tribe, often led by one of the premier’s relatives. Moreover, some 
states have multiple and competing security organizations with confused missions and little 
                                                 
44 Navarro, Political intelligence. 
45 K. A. Harkness, ‘The ethnic army and the state: explaining coup traps and the difficulties 
of democratization in Africa’, Journal of Conflict Resolution 60: 4, 2014, pp. 588–616; P. G. 
Roessler, ‘The enemy within: personal rule, coups, and civil war in Africa’, World Politics 
63: 2, 2011, pp. 300–346. 
46 Hazem Kandil, Soldiers, spies and statesmen: Egypt’s road to revolt (London: Verso, 
2012). 
 
coordination, while others are highly centralized. In her final chapter, Greitens extends her 
ideas to explain Chile under Pinochet, the East German Stasi and Saddam Hussein’s Iraq, 
suggesting that leaders are notably sensitive to these choices and develop a bespoke 
institutional design for their intelligence and security apparatus that accords with the main 
challenges they face.47 
Accordingly, it appears that leaders who are worried about insider threats within their own 
circle, typically senior military leaders, protect themselves by deploying agencies that are 
highly fragmented and are led by family members. Saudi Arabia is an example: here, the 
National Guard’s main function seems to be to protect the royal family against the armed 
forces. This competition, Greitens argues, keeps each agency off balance and is more likely 
to make them all invest in the status quo. However, the cost, she further argues, is that they 
are less well equipped to deal with internal popular revolt or external threats. Conversely, 
unitary and inclusive organs that are closer to state bureaucracies than parties and leaders are 
better at addressing wider threats but pose the possibility of offering a coup platform. She 
also argues that organizational design is a factor in determining the level of state violence 
against civilians.48 
New evidence on the role of security agencies in Kenya seems to confirm these findings 
about ethnicity. For autocrats facing elections, officers in the internal security apparatus play 
a crucial role by engaging in coercion on behalf of the incumbent. Yet reliance on these 
officers introduces a principal–agent problem: officers can quietely depart from the leader’s 
demands. To solve this problem, leaders strategically post officers to different locations based 
on an area’s importance to the election and the expected loyalty of an officer. Mai Hassan, 
using a dataset of 8,000 local security appointments within Kenya in the 1990s, found that the 
president’s co-ethnic officers were sent to, and the opposition’s co-ethnic officers were kept 
away from, swing areas. This demonstrates one way in which authoritarian state institutions 
can persist despite the introduction of multi-party elections and can prevent full 
democratization.49  
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The obvious alternative to researching structure is examining ideas. How does ideology 
influence state terror? As we have seen, most research on state repression has focused on 
power structures to explain the nature of repression. Yet we know little about the internal 
characteristics of the security forces that effect repression. Adam Scharpf argues that 
particular levels of ideological belief within the security apparatus result in different levels of 
repression, regardless of orders from higher authority. Do officers whose ideas converge with 
those of the leader repress more enthusiastically? Scharpf has analysed these issues using 
both qualitative and quantitative data in the context of Argentina’s Dirty War during the late 
1970s. He argues that loyal nationalist officers in the infantry and artillery committed more 
violence than liberal cavalry officers who disliked the junta’s terror programme. In short, 
Scharpf shows that ideology matters and may offer an alternative avenue to Greiten’s 
structural approach to measuring reliability.50 
A further opportunity for deploying ideational frameworks is provided by the exploration of 
conspiracy theory. Even at their most absurd, popular conspiracy theories are revealing about 
how normal people understand the state, and how the hidden hand of the state is experienced 
by individuals and communities at the everyday level. In terms of subjectivities, conspiracy 
theory can illuminate what people believe is happening.51 In other words, frameworks based 
on conspiracy theory offer us insights into popular imaginaries about the secret state, or their 
views of malignant western interventions, rather than descriptions of verifiable events. We 
might even see the intense cynicism they reflect towards governments, both local and 
western, as an expression of resistance to the post-colonial nation-state. Aasim Akthar and 
Ali Ahmed have argued that we might consider the possibility that the exponents of 
conspiracy theory, ‘far from being uninformed, in fact understand a good deal more about 
their own societies than the liberal commentariat is prepared to acknowledge’.52 
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The more elaborate range of conceptual frameworks now in evidence is helpful—not least 
because they offer researchers more choice as they negotiate between what is intellectually 
desirable and what is possible in terms of research design and fieldwork. Traditionally, within 
intelligence studies, case-studies often choose their researchers rather than the other way 
around, because of difficult issues of data access. But we suggest that more attention to the 
work of area studies specialists again widens the range of possible resources; and so it is to 
these issues that we now turn. 
New research strategies in the field 
Unsurprisingly, the call for more comparison in the study of intelligence and security 
agencies has been especially strong among political scientists. The additional advantage of 
some comparative approaches is that they can address the empirical roadblock in the way of 
gaining access to rich data. Comparative studies, particularly those focused on organizational 
design, can make use of a range of public sources that are open and in some cases can be 
accessed remotely. Moreover, quite simply, an article that compares six countries requires 
fewer data for each case than a single in-depth case-study. Yet understandably this approach 
evokes a degree of uneasiness among area studies specialists.53 Indeed, there has always been 
a tension between inductive and particularist area studies tendencies, on the one hand, and the 
more generalizing and deductive tendencies that predominate in political science and 
sociology on the other.54 
A recent example of broad generalization is the work of Marco Cepik and Gustavo Möller, 
who have used network analysis to analyse national intelligence systems in the five BRICS 
countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa)—some of the largest developing 
economies in the world. This allowed them to consider how power was distributed within 
each national system, together with the implications of this for the system’s overall 
organizational stability. Deploying empirical data for the five cases drawn from public 
documents, government legislation and press reports, they were able to move beyond the 
traditional organizational charts and ‘wiring diagrams’. Using graphs and adjacency matrixes, 
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they were able to measure mutual relations between the nodes of the network.55 Yet even 
more than the work of Greitens, this sort of theory-testing by mapping nodes and indexes 
from public documents is likely to discomfort the dedicated area studies researcher. 
Many area studies researchers see these political science approaches as evidence of a three-
headed hydra that is devouring their core subject, as approaches that emphasize theory-testing 
comparison seem to conspire with research risk-avoidance in UK universities and restrictive 
security practices by the state in the global South. Mark Duffield has voiced his concern 
about the sequential move way from ethnographic fieldwork that involves a growing 
remoteness from the world and what he calls ‘the compensatory emergence of remote 
methodologies and the simulation of digital alternatives’.56 With the expansion of neo-liberal 
marketization, together with the rapid growth of the Internet and e-commerce in regions such 
as Africa and Latin America, more research is likely to be done remotely. But arguably, a 
range of other options remain.  
One answer to the problem that has been pioneered by area studies experts is diasporic 
research. Quite simply, the most oppressive states have unintentionally created their own 
risk-free database through migration. Having driven a proportion of their population beyond 
their own borders, they have enabled excellent and even statistically significant work to be 
done in neighbouring countries without the researcher ever setting foot in the target country. 
Oddly, this sort of research mirrors intelligence-gathering from refugees during the Cold 
War, which saw pop-up interview centres for those coming out of the Eastern bloc.57 In this 
way research about the experience of surveillance can be completed at little physical risk to 
either researcher or subjects. Moreover, this diaspora contains not only ordinary citizens but 
also former senior members of many regimes. Their memoirs remind us that cosmopolitan 
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cities teem with ex-ministers and indeed senior members of former intelligence and security 
services.58  
Another alternative to in-country research is the possibility of research by Skype, Facebook 
Messenger and other kinds of voice-over-internet communication. These channels make it 
much easier to contact and interview subjects at a distance without venturing into the field; 
but they potentially put the subject at a greater degree of risk. The standard research advice is 
to allow the subject to determine how far to take the conversation, but this assumes that the 
subject is as familiar as the interviewer with the intricacies of communications security, 
which may not be the case. The security agencies routinely monitor emails and social media, 
often using state-of-the-art systems such as ‘Finspy’ bought from companies in Britain and 
Germany. In short, remote research is not entirely risk-free and may simply export some risks 
in the direction of the subject.59 
What about in-country research itself? Clearly, each regime has different sensitivities, and 
can be anxious about things that seem innocuous to outsiders—or, indeed, the reverse. It is 
helpful to know what kinds of projects a government will tolerate. Conversations with 
experienced researchers are helpful, as are lists of projects funded by foundations, which are 
quite a good way of gauging what topics have proved to be acceptable in the past. Affiliations 
can also be helpful, since bureaucrats tend to trust well-known research centres. Quite often, 
the desk fee to gain admission as a visiting fellow is quite low compared to the advantage and 
prestige that this can confer, and so can be a wise investment. However confident one feels 
about the attitude of the security services, it is wise to expect attention, typically when 
passing through airports. For these reasons, the storage of research data presents significant 
issues. Password protection for all devices is critical, as is the latest encryption software, but 
even then storage may not be secure. There are particular complexities associated with 
getting the data ‘home’ safely. One the one hand, using email or WeTransfer gives some 
reassurance against confiscation at the airport, but makes anonymization more important. 
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This, in turn, closes off some research methods, such as discourse analysis, since recording is 
ill-advised.60 
Just because a regime is security-minded does not mean it is hostile to intelligence studies. 
For example, Hein Kiessling wrote a history of Pakistan’s ISI while living in Quetta and then 
Islamabad for 13 years, an extended stay which allowed him to establish his bona fides over 
time with a range of senior officers who understood the army-dominated ISI. Clearly, several 
officers felt the ISI organization had been misunderstood, even demonized, and wished to tell 
their story to a serious academic. Kiessling’s work rather resembles the kind of high-level 
access journalism conducted by people such as Bob Woodward in Washington.61 
Remarkably, Kiessling interviewed most of the important former ISI chiefs, including 
General Ziauddin Butt who was court-martialled by former President Pervez Musharraf. 
There were also long interviews with distinguished former army chiefs such as Generals 
Mirza Aslam Beg and Jehangir Karamat. He even obtained access to the papers of Colonel 
Syed Raza Ali, the central figure in the Special Operations Bureau, which trained the 
mujahideen for Afghanistan. Kiessling’s study is a testimony to what can be achieved using 
‘anecdotal’ and ethnographic interviews.62 
Nevertheless, while the possibilities of what can be achieved using sophisticated area studies 
approaches to fieldwork and long immersion in local cultures should be acknowledged, so 
should the limits to this type of work. Probably a minority of countries across the global 
South would encourage this sort of long-term patient investigation of their foreign and 
security services by visiting academics. These can be quickly identified through research on 
the status of their national archives and available collections. As a result, research is likely to 
be patchy. It is perhaps no accident that we have numerous studies of the secret service and 
security in Ghana, one of the more benign democracies in Africa.63 Here, the long-serving 
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former head of security Kofi Bentum Quantson has not only written his own account of 
events but has also appeared on television to talk about creative writing. Not every country is 
so welcoming.64  
Intelligence and ethics 
Over the past two decades, the academic intelligence studies literature has consciously and 
successfully developed its research frameworks in areas such as epistemology and ontology. 
Yet neither of these two substantial bodies of writing addresses the subject of the ethics of 
researching intelligence, which is particularly peculiar as intelligence scholars have tended to 
write extensively on intelligence practitioner ethics.65 This gap is more remarkable when we 
compare the situation with that pertaining in cognate areas such as terrorism studies, which 
has reflected on its researcher ethics extensively.66 Moreover, unlike anthropology, 
intelligence studies has little literature on the matter of academics assisting secret services 
with training and research. It is perhaps worth pausing to ask why this is. 
Intelligence studies has been perceived as ethically risk-free territory for academics. This is 
because historically it has been an area of study mostly practised by westerners in the West. 
For political scientists, copious quantities of material have been released under Freedom of 
Information Act provisions, and the profusion of public inquiries and accountability 
committees, with their voluminous reports, supplement abundant press material since 9/11. 
Interviews with retired officials have proved easy to secure, and many intelligence services 
have their own academic outreach programmes. In the West, while intelligence researchers 
are discreetly watched, no academic has been sent to jail for investigating the secret state. No 
former official has been prosecuted for talking to academics, and no book on intelligence by 
an academic has been subject to an injunction. In short, for academics, this realm seems no 
riskier than studying local government in Norwich.67 
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Intelligence studies research is also perceived as ethically inert because much of it is rooted 
in the past. Before 2000, this relatively new subdiscipline was largely populated by 
historians, and while it is becoming more interdisciplinary, with growing interest from 
geography, education and communication studies, it still has a strong historical focus. Those 
working from historical archives have been provided with a convenient firewall, since the 
material they are mining has been deliberately declassified by officials and placed in archives 
for public inspection. Departmental record officers do their best to dry clean the archives 
before they are released, and then researchers work in earnest to uncover bits of dirty laundry 
that have been missed. The whole enterprise has the feeling of a Victorian parlour game.68  
This has created a worrying ethical bubble. Visiting academics sometimes have little 
perception of the risks entailed in research. Moreover, these risks are unpredictable. In 2018 
Matthew Hedges, a PhD student from Durham University undertaking mundane security 
research in the United Arab Emirates, was arrested, charged with espionage and initially 
sentenced to ten years’ imprisonment.69 This was not an isolated incident. In early 2016 
Giulio Regeni, a Cambridge University PhD candidate undertaking research in Egypt on 
trade unions, was killed, almost certainly by the internal security forces.70 Even historians can 
be at risk. In 2017 Xiyue Wang, a doctoral student in history at Princeton University, was 
sentenced to ten years’ imprisonment in Tajikistan on charges of spying after having already 
spent a year in prison. He was not conducting interviews but focusing on archival research on 
the Qajar dynasty, which ruled from 1785 to 1925.71 None of these three postgraduate 
students was researching intelligence. Nevertheless, their cases highlight the dangers of 
conducting any research that involves scrutiny of politically sensitive topics.  
Although intelligence studies now has its main professional home within the International 
Studies Association, in terms of its approaches it is perhaps spiritually closer to history and 
area studies in that it privileges hard-won empirical data. Rather like ethnographers, these 
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academics feel that primary research is important, not simply to avoid over-reliance on 
theory, but also to verify data in a field where deception is frequently part of the business. 
This is particularly important in conflict and crisis situations, where meanings are deeply 
contested. Yet university ethics guidance is changing, and the sort of research needed to tell 
the story of secret services in the global South is becoming more difficult to undertake.  
The postgraduate student environment is notably hazardous. Some students who are studying 
in western countries from semi-authoritarian countries may opt to undertake dissertations on 
issues related to their own security state—internet surveillance is an especially popular 
topic—but with no clear sense of what the consequences of this may be for them when they 
return home. Events in Turkey have produced a veritable diaspora of research students, all 
eager to write about the activities of security agencies but with little guidance on what this 
might mean for their future career or life trajectories, or for relatives still in their home 
country—an issue thrown into relief by the episode of the UK’s Iraq ‘dodgy dossier’.72 Yet in 
terms of research, access to private archives or members of the diaspora network or 
indigenous students are all valued in the effort to move intelligence studies forward. Without 
this assistance, how are the stories of the Mukhabarat in Syria, Jordan or Egypt to be told? 
And there is a new nemesis western scholars studying security in the global South have to 
face. Not only do they have to worry about local security agencies in the field, they also have 
to look out for their own governments when they return. Recent UK and US legislation 
presents problems for security researchers visiting any region where non-state armed groups 
operate (and they are ubiquitous).73 Are returning researchers likely to find their laptops and 
flash drives scrutinized? Will European security agencies share these data with the United 
States? The evidence suggests that some authorities view particular institutions with which 
they themselves have a research relationship as having a ‘licence’ to carry out this work, 
while they remain suspicious of others. As Peter and Strazzari have pointed out, there are 
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multiple ambiguities and hypocrisies here.74 Western security agencies are hungry for data, 
yet suspicious of those who produce it. Universities are eager for ‘impact’ and Global 
Challenges Research Fund grant income, but risk-averse when faced with fieldwork 
proposals.75 
Yet beguiling opportunities beckon in the context of security sector reform. Over the past two 
decades, efforts to improve both the efficiency and the ethical standards of secret services in 
less developed countries have resulted in a considerable demand for security expertise. Some 
of this has been met by private intelligence companies and some of it has been met by 
universities. The gradual conflation of intelligence and information in a world of ‘big data’ 
has only intensified this nexus. On the one hand, this can provide opportunities for 
‘embedded research’, since access to problematic areas can be achieved while training local 
security forces. Moreover, results are more likely to be authentic if researchers work with 
security agencies, effectively as participant observers. On the other hand, the scope for 
controversy is considerable—as was highlighted during the debates surrounding the US 
Army’s Human Terrain System Project. Scholarly reactions among anthropologists and 
ethnographers amounted to an outright disciplinary rejection of such practices. Intelligence 
studies scholars currently enjoy numerous examples of such embedded projects, often in the 
context of training or security sector reform, but they have yet to engage in this difficult 
debate.76  
Conclusion 
Researching the secret services in the global South is both useful and important. It is also 
long overdue, and could constitute the next ‘missing dimension’ of intelligence and 
surveillance studies. However, in some countries it presents practical and ethical challenges 
that have been largely ignored by intelligence scholars, who have hitherto lived in an 
Anglospheric bubble where little consideration has been given to the development of 
intelligence ethics for researchers. The biggest dangers here are perhaps misunderstandings. 
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The ‘spooky’ security services are not necessarily a source of risk, since after all, like 
journalism and academia, their members represent a particular kind of information 
professional, and some are keen to tell their story and conduct academic outreach. But any 
research project engaging with this requires a thoughtful strategy to be in place.77 Any such 
strategy must include a careful consideration of research ethics, an area that demands 
attention. Most importantly, we must avoid the Orientalizing practice of defining particular 
areas and/or services as ‘dangerous’, compounding the current problems of the securitization 
of research and the homogenizing labels imposed upon diverse regions by university ethics 
committees.78  
The successful study of secret services across the global South is clearly possible. Indeed, the 
important call made by Davies and Gustafson to examine ‘intelligence elsewhere’ is 
increasingly being answered.79 Oddly, the best work is probably being produced by 
comparative politics experts or area studies scholars, less so by those working in intelligence 
or surveillance studies. Indeed, is not clear how far these four groups of scholars are reading 
each other’s literature or material in other languages. But, as David Art has argued, the study 
of these subjects cannot always be held to conventional methodological standards, and 
scholars may have to ‘think more like detectives’. He also suggests that researchers must be 
willing to adopt a patient historical stance; and so maybe we must accept that the story of 
intelligence in the global South may be unravelled only slowly and over time.80 Perhaps the 
original intellectual home of intelligence studies, located in history, will come full circle? 
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